PETE WILLIAMS: Mr. Mueller, thank you very much. Let's begin with the morning of September 11th when you found out that the first plane hit the World Trade Center. How long had you been on this job? How did you find out? What did you do?

ROBERT MUELLER, DIRECTOR OF THE FBI: September 11th was the anniversary of my first week in the job, so I'd been director for one week. And as I recall it, I was in my office, and an individual came, I don't know who it was at this point, came in and said, "There's a plane that's crashed into the World Trade Center in New York."

And I look outside and it's a beautiful day. And you wonder how a pilot could be so off flight path to fly into the World Trade Center. And I think we were all wondering about that. And word came of the second plane going into the World Trade Center.

And we knew that it was something different, at which time the -- a number of us went down to our command center and started preparations for determining who was responsible for the -- these attacks on the World Trade Center. And then very shortly after words (SIC), we heard about other incidents, whether it be the Pentagon or what occurred in Pennsylvania.

WILLIAMS: And at what point did it become clear that the United States was under an unprecedented attack?

MUELLER: I think after the second plane went into the World Trade Center, it became very apparent that this was something other than an accident.

WILLIAMS: Since then has there ever been a day on this job when you have not thought about the war on terrorism?

MUELLER: No.

WILLIAMS: In that sense, isn't your job as director of the FBI different from any of your predecessors?

MUELLER: I think it may be a little bit different in terms of the issues that we're dealing with in the sense that in the wake of September 11th, the mission of the bureau has become much more oriented toward gathering the intelligence that will enable us, along with CIA and others in the intelligence community, to prevent another attack.

And yes, our -- the role of the bureau has changed I think, since September 11th, as it must change in order to address threats to the continental that prior to September 11th, we knew were there, but just did not know the extent to which our enemies could -- make use of our freedom and -- and our openness to attack us. And so, yes, things have changed in the bureau since September 11th.

WILLIAMS: Is this the kind of thing that you wake up in the middle of the night and say, "What else should we be doing?"

MUELLER: Absolutely you do tend to wake up at three o'clock in the morning saying, "Have we done everything in the bureau to assure that we're protecting the American public?" It comes with the -- It comes with the job.

WILLIAMS: In a sense, has this mission energized headquarters more so than it's been in recent years?

MUELLER: I think it's energized the FBI as it has the CIA and just about any agency who's involved in addressing terrorism. Certainly, the Department of Defense is no different in what they've managed to accomplish in Afghanistan.

I think it has brought us to the realization that in the past whereas we had been an agency that has 56 field offices and most of the investigations are done out of the 56 field offices, in the future to address a challenge such as or a threat such as al Qaida, we have to do a much better job in analyzing information relating to al Qaida and centralizing that information, analyzing that information, using that information to try to prevent the next attack and disseminating that information to the CIA, to the Defense Department, to state and local law enforcement officers.

So, the relationship between headquarters and the field offices may have changed somewhat, but the bureau as a whole has been energized with the -- The FBI has -- as an agency is tremendously capable investigators. And the shift in the bureau has been from a understanding that we have to gather evidence to put it into a courtroom to an understanding that every piece of information that comes to our attention in the course of an investigation has to be analyzed to see whether it's a piece of a puzzle that'll paint a picture that will give us some insight into the next attack.

WILLIAMS: You talked about how the mission is changed. But in other concrete ways, how is the FBI of today different than the one you were an -- initially assigned to head up a year ago?

MUELLER: Well, I've talked a little bit about the shifting of responsibilities between the field and headquarters, the necessity of building the analytical capability at headquarters with the agents or analysts, improving our technology so that we have the technological capabilities of taking in this information and analyzing it and disseminating it.

We've dug up that analytical cadre. We've shifted 500, approximately 500 agents from other programs, such as narcotics, some violent crime to doing counter-terrorism. And we've changed our hiring.

We've changed our training to address issues relating to counter-terrorism. For instance, we are seeking those who speak languages that are important to our counter-terrorism mission. We are seeking computer specialists as agents. We're seeking those who have a scientific or engineering background.

In our training, we are enhancing our training in counter-terrorism areas, and I think across the institution, across the FBI, there isn't an agent or a a support person out there who doesn't understand that our principle function, mission at this point in time is try to prevent another attack such as September 11th.

WILLIAMS: If I were a new agent recruit just going to Quantico to get training, how would my training be different today than it was a year ago?

MUELLER: Well, we have enhanced training on counter-terrorism. A substantial number of hours are being added. We're adding another week to the 16 week course to add even more training in that regard. But we are in the process of changing the training to address not only counter-terrorism, but counterintelligence, those portions of our mission that are principally responsible for protecting the security of the United States. So, coupled with counter-terrorism, the training is changing to address counterintelligence as well.

WILLIAMS: In ways though is it hard to train a single person -- to be both a guy who can catch bank robbers, find people who kidnap little children, and at the same time, be aware of worldwide terrorist organizations and know what counterintelligence and counter-terrorism is all about? All those so separate that it's hard to get all of that packed into one agent?

MUELLER: No, I think the skills of our agents are in investigations, interviewing people, doing either document searches or searches on computer. The investigative skills and tools of our agents can be put to use in doing counter-terrorism, investigating somebody who is a potential terrorist, a potential bank robber, a potential white collar criminal. Those skills are used across the board.

What we have to develop is the analytical capability of taking the information that is brought in by the investigators, analyzing it, as I said, and be more predictive with that information, as opposed to thinking of it as pieces of evidence that we will put together to put into a courtroom to prosecute somebody and so is a shift in the end result.

The one thing I should add, though, is that it is important to the institution that we have people in it that are specialists, that have spent years a -- addressing counter-terrorism and in particular al Qaida. One of the changes, we brought down to head our counter-terrorism now Pat Demoreau who was in charge of the New York -- that portion of the New York office that addressed the al Qaida prosecutions. He is steeped in al Qaida, and he knows and it's important that he be part of the -- those individuals within the bureau who are address al Qaida.

So, it's a combination of our investigative skills as well as the specialized knowledge that we build up over a period of time.

WILLIAMS: But then is it fair to say that the change in the FBI's mission is most keenly felt here at headquarters where you bring all that together?

MUELLER: I think it's keenly felt here, because counter-terrorism will grow. But it's also felt around -- in each of the field offices where the agents, particularly since September 11th, and particularly, you're right, after September 11th, better than half of our agent force was doing -- or were running down leads relating to September 11th.

We have 11,000, approximately 11,500 agents. We had 6500 agents who were participating in the investigation of the event of September 11th in the weeks and months following September 11th. Now that has dropped off some as we've gone through the million leads that were generated in the wake up September 11th.

But throughout the country, and it doesn't make any difference where you are an agent, you have participated in one way, shape or form in a terrorist investigation in the last -- in the last year.

WILLIAMS: Understanding that you have that flexibility, but nonetheless, you have a cadre of 11,500 agents and you are going to re-assign 500 of them. Is that enough to put into the counter-terrorism mission?

MUELLER: That's -- We did an evaluation maybe three months ago about what we needed in each field office. It was at that time what our field commanders, the special agents in charge, believe was necessary to address counter-terrorism issues within their particular regions. I'm gonna evaluate that every six months.

Another aspect of it is that we have joint terrorism taskforces in each of our 56 offices where we have not only FBI agents, but customs agents and DEA agents, immigration agents, but also state and local participants in these taskforces which leverage our ability around the country to address counter-terrorism.

So, we have assigned additional numbers of agents to the counter-terrorism mission within the bureau, but we have also leveraged that with any number of agents from other agencies, federal agencies as well as state and local law enforcement. And I have to evaluate every six months so see whether that's enough. I will just finish by saying whatever it takes, we will put on it.

WILLIAMS: I've seen a figure that says the total number of FBI agents is about a third the number of police that New York City has. Given that, given your new mission, given the fact that crime isn't going away, if anything it's starting to go back up again, is the FBI itself big enough?

MUELLER: I think we have to -- look at it just about every six months. My -- in the last year, I've been looking at what we need to do to prevent another terrorist attack, and that has been -- the foremost matter on my mind, the foremost challenge, the -- what I wanted to make certain we addressed.

In six months, I don't know where we'll be in that regard. It may well be that we need to expand to address other -- programs. I mean the Enron, Worldcom, the white collar crime investigations have taken some manpower, and we have to look at whether or not that is going to require additional resources.

I will say that both the administration as well as Congress has been very helpful when it has come to responding to our request. But when I make the request, I need to have in the back of my mind exactly what I need these additional individuals to do, what they will be doing and also be able to explain why I need them to do counter-terrorism and what impact they may be on other programs.

And it's almost important to assure that when we take agents from another program, that other program doesn't suffer, whether it be narcotics or white collar crime or -- or violent crime.

WILLIAMS: It sounds like you're preparing to ask for more.

MUELLER: I wouldn't go so -- We're looking at it. Every six months, we'll be looking at it. I will tell you that we've asked for additional agents in the '03 budget, yes. And the '04 budget, absolutely.

WILLIAMS: Right. Okay. Much was made of the fact over the past year that senior people were not in a position to be able to put all the little pieces of information together. These perhaps became kind of personified by the Phoenix memo and the Raleigh memo.

MUELLER: Yes.

WILLIAMS: What has -- What is different now about the FBI that you think you can put those things together that wasn't there before?

MUELLER: Yeah, there's several things. At the outset, every person in the FBI understanding what happened September 11th of last year understands that a piece of information in and of itself, may not look important, but with -- coupled with something else, may attain an importance that was undiscovered when you look at the individual piece.

And so the information is flowing up with the understanding that it must flow up a lot further than it had in the past. Part of that is driven from the top down. I get briefed every morning and every evening on terrorist investigations around the United States.

And so the information relating to a possible -- cadre of individuals here or there is put into briefing papers all the way to the top of the bureau twice a day. And -- that is different than what occurred prior to September 11th. And I think that is felt throughout the bureau, because the investigation can be in any city around the country, but the information has to flow back to headquarters and be integrated.

Secondly, we are better integrated with the CIA than we have ever been. And the exchanges of information are -- have been dramatically enhanced since September 11th. We have a cadre of CIA intelligence officers that have come in and work in our space now.

The group in counter-terrorism is run by a CIA officer. I have FBI agents over at the CIA counter-terrorism center, and the explain -- exchange of information, the flow of information is -- has been enhanced dramatically.

And lastly, I'd say our analytical capability has been enhanced and our ability of our analysts to look at information and put the pieces together has been enhanced by -- having more analysts doing it, having the flow of information greater than it had been before into the analysts. And we're in the process of getting the technology that they need to even further enhance their ability to do the analysis that's necessary.

WILLIAMS: As you know, there have been some who've said that sort of 50 years of bureaucracy leaves behind a certain amount of rust deposit in the pipes. And that there's been some resistance for agents, individual agents on the street to raise their heads up, to raise their hands and say I think I've got something. That it has to go through channels, and that that can grind at its own page. How are you persuaded that you've managed to blow the rust out of the pipes on that sense?

MUELLER: Oh, there's still some rust. I haven't blown all the rust out of the pipes, I'll you. There are procedures that grow up over a period of time, and it may have been appropriate at the period of time. We are looking at re-engineering the FBI to eliminate many of the bureaucratic hurdles.

The investigative talent should be both in the field and also at headquarters. It's important that we operate as one bureau. We remove the bureaucratic hurdles when we can and be a much more horizontal organization than we've been in the past.

One of the mechanisms to facilitate that will be the technology in the same way that G.E. or IBM or other companies have found themselves being more horizontal in the exchange of information flowing more freely, is attributable to the technological advancements. And we have to adapt that technology. And once we do, we will change procedures. We'll change job descriptions, and we will be a different bureau. And we're in that process now.

WILLIAMS: Shifting grounds now to the 9/11 attack itself, a couple of questions that you've addressed before, but I wanna kind of bring up to date. Are you satisfied that there was no one else in the United States who was in on the plan who assisted the hijackers?

MUELLER: Now that's a difficult question to answer in the way that it is framed. We have identified those we believe were the hijackers. And I can't get into too much detail, because there are ongoing potential trials that relate to those associated with the hijackers.

We have in my mind identified persons who were associated of the hijackers while they were in the United States and facilitated them in some respects. It may have been small: getting identification, helping with rooms, that kind of thing.

But I am satisfied we have done an exceptionally thorough investigation to identify those persons within the United States who had any contact with the hijackers during the time that the hijackers were in the United States.

WILLIAMS: But anybody who -- I mean people may have given them false I.D. not knowing what they intended to use them for. And in fact, many of those people have not been charged -- none of them have been charged with terrorism.

MUELLER: Correct.

WILLIAMS: Okay. But do you think there is anyone -- that they had any other help in the United States, people helping them who knew what they were intending to do?

MUELLER: Well, there -- I can't get into too many of the details, and we've got one individual who we believe was a participant and is about to face trial. So… With that exception, yeah, I think we -- I'll go back to say I think we've done a very good, thorough investigation and identified those persons who -- played some role. Now, in terms of there being others who were knowledgeable of the plot, there has been nobody who has been charged with that knowledge, with the exception of -- of Moussoaui.

WILLIAMS: Did the hijackers leave behind any evidence of their plan in the United States?

MUELLER: Not that I'm aware of. I think you're aware that we found in at least three of the -- Well, actually at the crash site in Pennsylvania as well as I believe a car in Dulles and one other place a document that was somewhat of a description of the stages you go through in leading up to committing a suicide attack. But it had none of the details of a -- of the plot at all.

WILLIAMS: No computer --

MUELLER: No.

WILLIAMS: -- logs?

MUELLER: No… Nothing in the United States.

WILLIAMS: What's the best estimate of how much the September 11th attacks actually cost the hijackers?

MUELLER: Anywhere from about $500,000 to $550,000. Someplace in that range.

WILLIAMS: And that's based on an analysis of their bank records and so forth?

MUELLER: That's correct. The monies came in from -- generally came in through -- from the Middle East to various bank accounts and wire transfers. And we have traced all of that and the total comes up to somewhere in excess of $500,000.

WILLIAMS: You're satisfied now that you've traced all the money.

MUELLER: Oh, there are probably some of the monies out there that we have not traced. Some of the operations were -- the planning certainly took place in Hamburg and perhaps Afghanistan and not perhaps, and in Afghanistan, and there were meetings elsewhere in the world. For instance, there was meeting, I think, people are familiar with in Malaysia. Now that costs money, and we may not have traced those dollars. So it may be in excess of $550,000 when you put all that together.

But the monies that came into the United States to support the hijackers while they were in the United States totals up to somewhere in excess of $500,000.

WILLIAMS: On the planned which you just touched on, can you give us the best understanding that the United States has now of how this attack was planned and by whom?

MUELLER: Well, we think it was planned in Hamburg certainly by the cell there. I think in recent weeks you've seen the reports from the German authorities about what they've discovered in terms of the planning. There were meetings, and at least one meeting we're aware of in Malaysia, where we believe that quite probably the plan was discussed. And we have information as to planning accomplished in Afghanistan. So, it occurred in all of these places.

WILLIAMS: Do you have any idea where did someone initially come up with the idea of attacking in the United States with airplanes?

MUELLER: You know, I think it probably was at a number of levels. It's very hard to pinpoint what level of the al Qaida structure -- or one individual who may have generated the plan. And as such things go, it is a combination of individuals who put together pieces of the plan. So, what comes out at the end may not look at what the initial idea -- or not -- may not resemble closely what the initial idea was.

WILLIAMS: There is that videotape where Bin Laden says that many of the people getting on the planes didn't really know what the final plan was going to be. Is it still the model that there were just the four pilots who knew what was gonna happen and the other guys were just along for protection?

MUELLER: We have -- excerpts from the videotape of Bin Laden in which he adverts to that. But we do not know what was in the minds of the individuals who killed themselves on September 11th.

WILLIAMS: What about this Al-Rashid, the man whose picture was found on a computer disk along with the 19 hijackers? Could he be a key in understanding how the attacks were planned?

MUELLER: It is possible. As you are probably aware the Saudis -- have -- are looking at that particular aspect of it.

WILLIAMS: How is that going so far?

MUELLER: The outcome -- The Saudis have been cooperative and -- throughout the investigate, and -- But the -- I'm reluctant to get into the details of whatever cooperation we may have with them.

WILLIAMS: Understood. Understood. You mentioned a meeting in Malaysia. We know that Atta went to Spain. Do you know why the hijackers took those trips? Why was it necessary to do that to further their plan?

MUELLER: Well, in as much as Atta's dead and others who participated in the conspiracy are now dead, we don't have that firsthand testimony or information as to what exactly was said and what was discussed at several of these meetings.

WILLIAMS: Does it appear to you that the hijackers actively looked at a possibility of using crop duster airplanes and abandoned that in favor of something else? What was the whole crop duster thing about?

MUELLER: Well, there was information early on when we went back and tried to reconstruct the activities of Atta and the other hijackers in the United States, there was information that came to our attention about inquiries about hijackers --

WILLIAMS: About crop dusters.

MUELLER: I mean about crop dusters, not hijackers. About crop dusters. And we chased down each of those leads, and in chasing down those leads, we did not come to the conclusion that there was a plan to utilize crop dusters. But nonetheless, the fact that there'd been inquiries made into crop dusters is enough to trigger our interest and concern, I might add.

WILLIAMS: Looking back now, in your opinion, are there warning signs that -- Did the hijackers give off warning signs while they were here that if followed up on could have prevented the September 11th attacks?

MUELLER: I think the hijackers were tremendously well-disciplined, gave off no warning signs as to this particular type of attack, the timing of attack, the methods that would be utilized or the fact that they individually were involved in some sort of attack. So, there were not those warning signs out there, in my mind, that would have enabled us to prevent what happened on September 11th.